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Abstract 
 
Reproductive health access is impeded by time, travel, and cost of care. These economic factors impact a 
patient’s ability to receive healthcare care and this paper tests if the cost of abortion access is increased by 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws. Disparity in reproductive equity due to state 
government regulation has implications on equity in public policy and accessibility to reproductive care. 
For abortion policy to be socially equitable, it must be distributive, providing the greatest benefit to the 
least advantaged. Assuming abortion demand is constant, this study seeks to understand the real cost 
associated with barriers to care due to state TRAP legislation creating inequality through supply-side 
restrictions. This paper uses statistical analysis to examine the cost variables of time, travel, childcare, and 
lost wages to test for equity in legislation. Findings show a positive relationship between the number of 
TRAP laws and hardship costs to patients, demonstrating inequitable state healthcare policy. Results 
indicate that those living in states with higher restrictions and regulations to abortion providers have a 
higher financial burden to accessing abortion care. Implications include recommendations for lawmakers, 
nonprofits, and abortion providers to improve access to abortion and lower the cost of care burdened by 
patients. 
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Reproductive Equity and Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws:  
The Time, Travel, and Cost of Abortion Access 
 
Introduction 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Provider (TRAP) laws are defined by the Center for 
Reproductive Rights as “laws that single out the medical practices of doctors who provide abortions and 
impose on them requirements that are different and more burdensome than those imposed on other 
medical practices” (Center for Reproductive Rights, n.d.). These laws include policies for patients such as 
mandatory ultrasounds and waiting periods, as well as requirements for doctors and facilities that range 
from expensive remodeling, hospital privileges, and complex reporting. In the United States, nearly one in 
four women will have an abortion during their lifetime and complications are rare (Jones & Jerman, 2017; 
Upadhyay, 2015). Yet, 44 states have laws and policies that restrict abortion providers above and beyond 
any other medical profession. 
The access to legal abortion was decided 45 years ago in Roe v. Wade (1973). This landmark case 
asserted that laws which criminalized or completely restricted access to abortion were unconstitutional. 
Civil abortion rights were included under the right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment. The Court balanced civil rights with state rights to regulate patient health and the potential 
of human life by allowing states to place regulations during the third trimester of pregnancy.  
Later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), the Supreme Court eroded Roe by allowing states 
to regulate abortions at all stages if it does not place an undue burden on abortion access. After Casey, 
states could impose laws for informed consent, parental consent, reporting requirements, and legally 
define what is considered a medical emergency for abortion care. Growing political mobilization from 
pro-life groups since Casey have led to anti-abortion laws in all but six states. The abortion incidence rate 
in in the United States, which rose after Roe, and has been on decline since Casey, has now dropped to 
under one million for the first time since 1973. While the causations for the declining abortion incidence 
rate are still being studied, the closure of clinics due to TRAP laws are among the leading potential 
reasons being examined (Jones & Jerman, 2014).  
Following the advancing implementation of TRAP laws, clinics across the United States have 
closed and people have lost access to legal abortion care. In the state of Texas, an area of high political 
action for TRAP laws, there were more than 40 abortion clinics in 2013. After the passage of Texas 
House Bill 2, one of the most restrictive TRAP laws seen to date, the number of abortion clinics in Texas 
dropped to 19 by 2016. Had the Supreme Court not overturned HB2 in Whole Woman's Health v. 
Hellerstedt (2016), Texas would have been left with as few as 10 abortion clinics, all in metropolitan 
cities, to service 5.4 million women of reproductive age (Ura, 2016).  
This paper will seek to understand the effect of state TRAP laws on abortion access and evaluate 
policy implications on the basis of civil rights. Civil rights are individual rights, and abortion rights will 
be framed through equity variables that impact individuals and their choices. Through statistical analysis, 
this paper examines the three reproductive health equity variables of time, travel, and cost for people 
receiving abortion care as it relates to healthcare barriers due to state TRAP legislation. The hypotheses 
will test if states with TRAP laws place an undue financial burden on patients to access abortion care. In 
the dialectic between abortion rights and state regulation, public policy implications include equality, 
healthcare access, and real economic hardship. 
 
Literature Review 
As a policy issue, abortion access has been a largely defined by the courts. In Beal v. Doe (1977) 
and Maher v. Doe (1977), the court begins to define the freedom asserted in Roe in terms of policy and 
shift in favor of states’ rights. The outcome of these two cases relieved states of any requirement to fund 
nontherapeutic abortions through Medicaid. These rulings established the State’s interest in childbirth 
pregnancy outcomes by making it near impossible for lower income people to access abortion care 
through state healthcare assistance (Segers, 1977). Today, thirty-two states follow the federal standard, 
only allowing for Medicaid funding to be used for abortion in cases of rape, incest, or life endangerment. 
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As abortion services cost between $400-$600, disallowing most claims for Medicaid coverage for 
abortion creates state controlled economic barriers that favor childbirth pregnancy outcomes that and 
allow only those with means access to their privacy rights granted in Roe. 
As demonstrated by Medicaid policy for abortion care, equity in the law and social equity can 
differ in public policy. Rosenbloom (2005) cautions on law that “constitutional procedural due process is 
overwhelmingly an individual right, not one that protects large groups from unfair deprivation of liberty 
or property by government.” While abortion is an individual right, the law does not protect against 
inequities that result from laws. Svara (2005) and Greenberg (2015) find that public policy can solve for 
social inequity through distributive polices. Distributive policies are defied by Rawls’s (2009) second 
principle as arranging social and economic inequalities to provide the greatest benefit to the least 
advantaged. For abortion policy to be socially equitable it must be accessible to the least advantaged. An 
example of a distributive abortion policy is Medi-Cal in California, which uses state funds to cover costs 
abortion costs for those who meet income qualifications to increase the accessibility of abortion to state 
citizens. 
Previous studies, such as Jones and Jerman (2014), and New (2011), used abortion incidence to 
measure accessibility of abortion care. Incidence only accounts for those that have accessed care, to 
understand accessibly is to also account for those unable access care. Understanding abortion as an issue 
in which demand is constant allows this study to measure the full scope of accessibility. Medoff (2010) 
analyzed abortion demand as a consumer good and found TRAP laws have limited to no impact on 
abortion demand. Demand for abortion remains constant when access is limited, thus abortion access is a 
supply side problem for redistribution.  
Abortion is part of the health care industry and supply is met by abortion providers. From the 
point of view of the lawmakers that propose TRAP laws, the intention of these laws is ensure equal access 
to quality healthcare by abortion providers. However, these laws do more to restrict access to care than 
improve quality of care. Internationally, the World Health Organization has established that laws to 
restrict abortion do not improve health care outcomes (Grimes, 2006). In an analysis of over 160 
countries, including the United States, Berer (2004) found countries with broad abortion policies had 
lower mortality from unsafe abortions than countries with high levels of legislative restricts on abortion. 
Restricting and regulating abortion does little to improve healthcare outcomes or ensure quality care.  
The disconnect between what lawmakers claim TRAP laws accomplish and the actuality of 
healthcare outcomes as reported by health organizations can be explained through partisanship. Party 
control of state legislation and governorship have been found to be the most important factor to determine 
if TRAP laws are enacted, with Republican control being positively associated with TRAP law enactment 
(Medoff, 2011).  TRAP laws are a partisan issue and lawmakers who support such laws are acting more in 
the interest of partisan politics than public health.  
If laws that restrict abortion do not improve healthcare outcomes, then it is important to 
understand what these laws do accomplish. Predominantly, research on the outcome of TRAP laws have 
found equity issues with supply-side access. Five years post-Roe, Hansen (1980) found people of means 
have access to abortion, while people in rural, economically depressed areas are unable to access services 
because of a lack of supply. Hansen found the following policies and factors increased supply 
subsequently increased abortion rate: (1) the proportion of state hospitals providing abortions (2) 
Medicaid funds for family planning (3) urban residency. Medoff (2010) supports Hansen and found states 
with Medicaid funding for abortion report 4% more abortion incident than those that do not. When 
Medicaid funding is supplied, there are more incidences of abortion in a state as people are able to utilize 
state funds to pay for care. 
As Medicaid funding was one of the first incidences of abortion restriction laws, it is a well-
documented social policy for abortion access. TRAP laws following Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) 
are less understood. From 1983 to 2015 states enacted almost 700 restrictions that impacted providers and 
patients including: limits on medication abortion, restrictions on private insurance coverage, requirements 
for parental involvement, mandatory counseling, waiting periods, reporting requirements, and gestational 
limitations (Dempsey, 2014). In 2011, New found evidence to suggest that anti-abortion legislation is a 
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factor in abortion incidence decline. However, this study was unable to determine exactly why this decline 
in abortions after TRAP laws are enacted happens. 
To understand why abortion rates are in decline as a result of TRAP laws, public health scholars 
have studied hardship factors that reduce supply-side factors. House Bill 2 in Texas had a large impact on 
clinics, reducing the number of facilities from 40 clinics in 2013 to 19 predominately urban located 
clinics in 2016. Gerdts (2016), through the use of patient surveys before and after the passage of H.B. 2, 
found increased travel burdens on abortion patients following the law. The average distance for patient 
travel increased four-fold and 44% of participants traveled over 50 miles in 2014 to obtain an abortion. 
Patients whose nearest clinic closed following HB2 had a higher probability of other hardship experiences 
than those whose nearest clinic remained open. These findings demonstrate that TRAP laws which result 
in clinic closures increase burdens for abortion patients in the form of travel. 
Previous studies that focus on abortion incidence or patient hardship only account for people that 
were able to access services. This paper will assume demand is unchanged by TRAP laws and seek to 
understand the impact of TRAP laws on all individuals of reproductive means that may utilize abortion 
services. The often-stated intent of TRAP laws by politics may be to ensure quality abortion care; 
however, it is unclear how effective these laws are in meeting this goal and whether quality care includes 
accessibility to care. Due to the relationship between TRAP laws and increased hardships, it is 
questionable who can access abortion care.  
Using policy equity principles, TRAP laws will be analyzed to establish if they are distributive in 
nature. The conceptual hypothesis will test that if TRAP laws are inequitable, they will impede the least 
advantaged to access abortion. If TRAP laws are inequitable, abortion access will only be available to 
those with the means to access care. Equity in access to abortion care will quantified using factors of time, 
travel, and cost. As abortion care has been established as more accessible in urban locations, this paper 
will focus on mid-size cities to understand TRAP law equity in a different population.  
 
Data Collection and Analytic Technique 
This study seeks to understand the impact of TRAP laws on social equity using statistical 
analysis. The operationalized hypothesis for analysis is that an increase in the number of TRAP laws will 
cause an increase in the financial hardship on abortion patients. There are no available data sets from 
previous studies to analyze the operationalized hypothesis. Using previous literature on abortion access 
and practical applications from knowledge of patient experience, variables were selected and collected by 
the researcher. Data collected to test the hypothesis, using cross-sectional regression analysis, focused on 
laws and equity variables in effect as of January 1, 2018. 
 
Sample 
The unit of analysis is mid-size US cities that range in total population from 100,000-300,000. As 
it has been established that urban residents have better access to abortion care, this study will focus on 
mid-size cities to understand the redistribution issue for a different population. The sample size of the 
study is one hundred cities (n=100) that were randomly generated from a list of most populous 
incorporated US cities (within their defined limits) sourced from the 2016 estimate of the US Census.  
 
Independent variable 
The independent variable is the number of TRAP laws in the state. This variable was sourced for 
the Guttmacher Institute categories for TRAP regulations by state as of February 1, 2018 (Appendix 1). 
Laws that are permanently enjoined, or are no longer in effect, were not included in the study. The six 
sample cities located in Oregon and Colorado had the fewest TRAP laws at 2 (Table 1). The four sample 
cities located in Kansas had the most TRAP laws at 13. The median number of TRAP laws in the sample 
is 8, the mode is 10. No city in the sample had a zero value for this variable. 
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a calculated cost of financial hardship on abortion patients and provides 
an understanding of the real, often hidden, cost of care. This continuous interval variable represents the 
concept of “undue burden” as outlined in Casey v. Planned Parenthood (1992) as "substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” The total financial hardship is 
measured by a sum costs associated with travel, time, wage loss, and childcare. This variable does not 
account for the cost of the abortion procedure as this is a market driven cost set by providers. The total 
financial hardship represents the practical substantial obstacles on abortion patients placed by state 
policies that regulate abortion providers. 
The total financial hardship cost was calculated using four different data points that were 
established and collected by the researcher. The cost of travel is the distance travelled from the city to 
reach an abortion provider. This is represented as a financial value as the cost per mile. Each distance was 
turned into the cost per mile using the current average cost of per mile of the American Automobile 
Association (AAA) of $0.59831. If a patient must drive any distance outside their city to reach a provider, 
the distance accounts for return trips and any multiple round trips due to laws that require a waiting 
period. 
The value for the cost of time is represented by the lodging and meals accrued for overnight stays 
at a provider location. The cost of time assumes patients that must drive over fifty miles for care and wait 
eighteen hours or more between counseling and procedure appointments will need overnight 
accommodations (n=15) (Appendix 2). The cost of time is calculated by adding the per diem max from 
General Services Administration (GSA) to the cities in which patients would fit overnight criteria. The 
GSA per diem is the allowance for lodging (excluding taxes), meals and incidental expenses using 
average daily rate (ADR) data that is timely, industry accepted, and utilized by the government. 
The value for wage loss utilizes Bureau of Labor Statistics data from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages, for the second quarter of 2017, by all Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). 
This census provides the average weekly wage to find the average daily wage for this value. For patients 
that can receive an abortion within one day, the average wage of one day is added to the total hardship. 
For patients that must receive two appointments, due to TRAP law waiting times, the average wage of 
two days is added to the total hardship. Three days of lost wages were added for patients travelling from 
Springfield, Missouri where the closest provider is in Fayetteville, AR which requires at 48 hours wait 
time between appointments. 
The literature on patient characteristics finds that the majority of abortion patients have had at 
least one birth (Jones & Jerman, 2017). To account for this, the cost of child care was added to the total 
financial hardship value. Cost of child care is collected from recent Care Price Index from Care.com, a 
comprehensive report of paid child care in the United States. If city level data was not available, the state 
average was utilized. The derived daily rate of in-home child care reflects if multiple days of care are 
required and is adjusted by 0.59 to account for rate of abortion patients that are already parents. 
 
Control Variables 
 Control variables for partisanship, city population, predictive fertility, and the clinic availability 
were collected. Partisanship is a categorical variable indicating if the state where the city is located has a 
Republican (GOP) supermajority. States in that have conservative control of the legislator and a 
Republican governor received dummy variable of “1”, all other states receive a “0”. The population of the 
city was derived from the 2016 US Census estimate and is the population per thousands. The predictive 
fertility is the total fertility rate (TFR). The TFR is a population health statistic from the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) and is the average number of children that is expected to be born per “woman” (or 
person with a uterus) in their lifetime. As the CDC does not track pregnancy rate, the TFR controls for the 
potential demand for abortion based on fertility.  
Clinic availability controls for the diminishing supply side availability of abortion providers as 
states restrict and regulate practices. This value was collected through the Guttmacher Institute and 
controls for the percent change in the number of clinics providing abortion services between 2011 and 
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2014 (Jones & Jerman, 2014). On average, clinic availability was found in the sample to be decreasing at 
a rate of 12.5%, with 75% of the sample reporting a negative change in provider access by 2014. 
Controlling for the decline in clinic availability isolates TRAP laws as the potential factor driving the rise 
in financial hardships to address public policy outcomes from a patient access viewpoint rather than 
provider closures. 
Findings 
 The cross-sectional data set was examined for multivariable linear regression analysis using IBM 
SPSS software. The model yielded a 60.3% R Square score with moderate associated strength to explain 
the variance in hardship costs (Table 2). ANOVA testing of the multivariable regression model showed 
statistically significance difference between group means (p < 0.01), therefore, the model is statistically 
significant (Table 3). 
The independent variable, TRAP laws, was found to be significant (p < 0.001) and produced a 
coefficient score of 41.68. These results indicate that there is a positive relationship between TRAP laws 
and hardship costs to support the operationalized hypothesis. This result can be interpreted as if the 
number of TRAP laws raises by 1, then the cost of financial hardship is likely to raise by $41.68. All 
other variables and the constant did not meet significance thresholds (p > 0.05).  
The regression equation produced a negative coefficient for partisanship which would indicate a 
decreasing effect by which hardship costs would be reduced by a GOP majority. The variables for TRAP 
laws and partisanship were expected to be positively linearly related, as Medoff (2011) found Republican 
supermajorities in states to be an indicator for TRAP law enactment. Validity diagnostics explains this 
error and found multicollinearity among the variables for TRAP laws and partisanship (VIF > 3). When 
the variable for partisanship was removed, the collinearity was solved (VIF < 1.95). A better value for 
this variable is needed. 
Implications and Recommendations 
This understanding of total abortion cost factoring in hardship costs demonstrates how TRAP 
laws impact everyday people attempting to access reproductive healthcare in midsize cities across the 
United States. While Planned Parenthood estimates the cost of abortion fluctuates nationwide between 
$350-950 (depending on method and timing), the average hardship cost of the study added $448 in travel, 
time, lost wages, and childcare costs. Even in ideal political climates, people pay more than the basic cost 
of care for an abortion procedure. This study found the people of Eugene (OR), who have provider in 
town and a democratic supermajority in the state, still suffer a hardship cost of $225. We must account for 
the true cost of care when evaluating the equity of abortion policy. 
Policymakers and advocates should account for the real cost of seeking abortion care when 
promoting reproductive equity and access. To achieve best health outcomes and respect human rights, the 
World Health Organization (2012) recommends that countries “eliminate barriers that impede women’s 
access to health services, such as high fees for health-care services, the requirement for preliminary 
authorization by spouse, parent or hospital authorities, long distances from health facilities”.  To eliminate 
barriers, lawmakers should enact distributive abortion policies that increase the availability of supply 
(providers) and decrease the cost of care placed on patients.  
Expanding state Medicaid to cover all abortion services would serve to both reduce patient costs 
and help support providers in areas that rely on state insurance programs. Jones and Jerman (2014) found 
that while the majority of patients nationally paid out of pocket for their abortion, Medicaid was the most 
common form of payment in the 15 states that do not restrict Medicaid funding for abortion. Attempting 
to repeal and replace Medicaid laws state by state would be costly and extremely difficult for abortion 
advocates and lawmakers. Repealing the Hyde amendment would expediate the expansion of Medicaid 
for abortion by removing the federal limits on benefits. Several advocacy groups, including the Center for 
Reproductive Rights, currently have campaigns to end Hyde and have framed the issue as one of 
economic justice. 
Due to restrictive state policies, the burden of cost falls to patients. Abortion providers and 
charities work to mitigate these costs and assist patients in accessing care. Nonprofit advocates, such as 
the National Network of Abortion Funds (NAAF), provide practical support for patients through financial 
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aid and by removing logistical barriers. NAAF is constantly fundraising and can utilize the findings of 
this paper to sum the expected additional costs. Understanding a more complete cost of abortion care can 
allow NAAF to realistic goals for charitable abortion funding and drive donations.  
Additionally, to solve for inequity, abortion providers should open new clinics in areas facing 
extreme barriers due to high travel costs such as Springfield, MO (hardship cost of $1,168). Returning 
access to an area will be a difficult and costly task due to hostile environments that closed previous 
clinics. Abortion providers should seek innovative solutions such as grant funding, community advocacy 
partnerships, and expanded relationships with area medical providers to reintroduce care to a community. 
To achieve this abortion providers may choose to transition to a 501(c)3 structure as Whole Woman’s 
Health did to reopen their Austin (TX) clinic under Whole Woman’s Health Alliance (WWHA). The 
nonprofit structure allows WWHA to collect donations to offset operating expenses. While a nonprofit 
model might not lower the cost of the abortion procedure, providing access to care close to home will 
lower the overall hardship costs paid by patients through time, travel, childcare, and lost wages.  
 
Limitations 
Limitations of this research include sample size, TRAP law assessment, and variable redundancy 
with partisanship values. Trends in the sample found midsize cities often located proximal to large urban 
areas that had access to abortion care. In the sample only 16% of cities would require travel 50 miles or 
more. Incorporating the 200 additional midsize cities in the United States in the sample may solve for this 
issue. This paper also approached TRAP laws as a comparable total and further research could better 
define which laws are causing which trends in rising cost. Additionally, this paper focused on laws with 
restrict abortion providers and did not include regulations that encourage patients to access state funds for 
services such as the California Reproductive FACT Act.  
 
Conclusion 
 Patients seeking abortion care face a high hidden cost of care due to access barriers created by 
TRAP laws. Statistical analysis shows a positive relationship between the number of TRAP laws a state has 
enacted and higher costs to abortion patients seeking care. These results indicate that TRAP laws are not 
distributive in nature and are not socially equitable laws. The link between increasing abortion regulation 
and the increasing cost of abortion care in midsize U.S. cities demonstrates an undue financial burden that 
is contrary to legal standards under Casey (1992). TRAP laws do not meet the legal or social standards for 
equitable policy. 
 Previous studies have focused on the effects of TRAP laws on the abortion incidence and the 
availability of providers. It is known that TRAP laws close clinics that provide abortion services as 
providers are unable to comply with costly and difficult policies imposed by states. Abortion incidence is 
a complex issue that is impacted by decline in unintended pregnancy from contraceptive access, in addition 
to a drop-in clinic availably (Jones & Jerman, 2014). However, little is known about people who are unable 
access abortion services. By understanding the barriers to access, a clearer picture of who is denied care 
due to financial hardships emerges. 
 The cost of an abortion procedure can range between $350-900 depending on method and provider. 
There are only five states in the United States that voluntarily provide Medicaid funds for abortions, the 
majority of states follow the federal Hyde amendment restrictions. The Hyde amendment (1976) restricts 
Medicaid funding from the federal government to pay for abortion procedures except in cases of sexual 
crime or the life of the pregnant person. Additionally, there are 26 states also have laws that restrict private 
insurance plans offered through exchanges from covering abortions. These laws restrict the known cost of 
care for abortion procedures and many abortion providers offer charitable funding to offset the cost of an 
abortion procedure.  
 This paper is interested in the hidden cost of care on abortion patients and whether TRAP laws 
impact these access barriers. The hidden cost of care represents the financial hardships that are increased 
when providers are unavailable or unwelcome in a state. These costs include the travel to and from clinics, 
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the time spent due to mandatory wait laws, the cost of childcare, and lost wages. As the availability of 
abortion providers declines due TRAP laws, the factors of time, travel, and associated costs rise for patients. 
 Statistical analysis finds a positive correlation between the number of TRAP laws a state has in 
effect as of the beginning of 2018 and the financial hardships on abortion patients. As the number of TRAP 
laws rises by 1, there is an expected rise of $45.68 in financial hardship. On average, states have 7.28 TRAP 
laws which would assume an average hardship cost of $332.55, in addition to the cost of the abortion 
procedure. This paper finds a relationship between a rise in abortion regulation and a rise in abortion cost 
that must be accounted for in policy making. 
 Lawmakers are tasked with enacting equitable policy that benefits the least advantaged. TRAP laws 
are regulatory policies that control the behavior of a specific group rather than provide equitable access to 
abortion care. Healthcare has been a policy area that has struggled with equity issues and governments have 
taken steps to enact redistributive policies that improve access to care. The 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) offered redistributive polices for reproductive health by providing provisions 
for free birth control. The 2017 Reproductive Health Equity Act guarantees that the people of Oregon 
regardless of citizenship, gender identity, or insurance have access to reproductive health services including 
family planning, abortion, and postpartum care. The trend is reproductive healthcare policy shows a country 
divided with states that seek to provide equity in care and those that continue to restrict access. 
 The Supreme Court has shaped reproductive freedom in this country three times, in Roe (1972), 
Casey (1992), and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016). In each of these cases, states were required 
to redefine the Constitutional limits on regulating abortion policy. The “undue burden” standard set by 
Casey (1992) and "[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a 
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right." The holding in 
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) found the portions of the Texas TRAP law H.B. 2 requiring 
abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges and surgical center requirements for facilities to 
fail the undue burden test as they place obstacles on abortion patients. The Supreme Court has held abortion 
access is a right and laws that restrict access do not meet Constitutional standards. 
 This study provides new information to examine the barriers to abortion care created by TRAP 
laws across mid-size cities in the United States. A positive relationship exists between the number of TRAP 
laws in a state and the cost to abortion patients to access care. Policymakers utilize this understanding of 
the hidden cost of care to deter additional TRAP laws and as a basis to repeal existing legalization. To 
achieve equity in reproductive policy, barriers to access care must be reduced and eliminated. Abortion 
patients deserve care that does not come with a hidden cost and governments that support all choices. 
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Tables and Graphs 
Graph 1: Scatterplot of key variables 
a. y = 43.428x + 120.53 
b. R² = 0.5806 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. D. Variance Range 
Hardship Cost $225.89 $1,168.87 $448.41 196.83 38,743.92 $942.98 
TRAP Laws 2.00 12.00 7.55 3.45 11.93 11.00 
Population 91.00 298.00 155.63 51.07 2,608.36 207.00 
Partisanship - 1.00 0.54 0.50 0.25 1.00 
Fertility (TFR) 1.54 2.24 1.84 0.13 0.02 0.70 
Clinic Availability (75.00) 71.00 (12.58) 23.50 23.50 146.00 
N 100      
 
Table 2: Regression analysis results on hardship cost  
 Variables   Coefficient   t-value   Sig.   VIF  
 TRAP Laws***             45.68         7.10  0.00        3.02  
 Clinic Availability             (1.05)       (1.74) 0.09        1.24  
 Population              (0.00)       (1.03) 0.30        1.06  
 Partisanship            (56.62)       (1.40) 0.17        2.52  
 Fertility (TFR)             76.12         0.54  0.59        1.92  
 (Constant)             22.28         0.09  0.93 
 
R Square   0.603 
   
F-Value   28.56 
   
 N  100       
 Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 
Guttmacher Institute Categories for Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers  
1. Must be performed by a licensed physician 
2. When must be performed in a hospital 
3. When second physician must participate 
4. Prohibited after a time (except in cases of life or health endangerment) 
5. "Partial-birth" abortion banned 
6. Public funding of abortion (except in cases of life or health endangerment) 
7. Private insurance coverage limited 
8. Providers may refuse to participate: Individuals 
9. Providers may refuse to participate: Institutions 
10. Mandated counseling includes information on: breast cancer 
11. Mandated counseling includes information on: fetal pain 
12. Mandated counseling includes information on: negative psychological effects 
13. Waiting period (in hours) after counseling 
14. Parental involvement required for minors 
 
Appendix 2 
List of cities where patients must drive over fifty miles for care and wait eighteen hours or more 
between counseling and procedure appointments 
City 
Travel Distance (by 
mile) 
Waiting Time (in 
hours) 
Brownsville, TX 60 18 
Kansas City, KS 64 24 
Topeka, KS 64 24 
South Bend, IN 67 24 
Beaumont, TX 76 24 
Springfield, MO 88 48 
North Charleston, SC 90 24 
Evansville, IN 100 24 
Charleston, SC 115 18 
Wichita Falls, TX 123 24 
Fort Wayne, IN 127 24 
Laredo, TX 147 24 
San Angelo, TX 175 24 
Baton Rouge, LA 179 24 
Lafayette, KS 210 24 
 
 
